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Abstract
This paper considers a simple model where a social planner can influence the spread-intensity
of an infection wave, and, consequently, also the economic activity and population health,
through a single parameter. Population health is assumed to only be negatively affected when
the number of simultaneously infected exceeds health care capacity. The main finding is that
if (i) the planner attaches a positive weight on economic activity and (ii) it is more harmful
for the economy to be locked down for longer than shorter time periods, then the optimal
policy is to (weakly) exceed health care capacity at some time.
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1 Introduction
A central part of many countries’ policies to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic has been to “flatten
the curve.” That is, a more gradual uptick of infected persons prevent health care systems to be
overburdened and save human lives. For example, Greenstone and Nigam (2020) (building on
Ferguson et al., 2020) estimate that 630,000 lives in the US could be saved by social distancing
policies assuring that intensive care units are not overwhelmed during the peak of the Covid-19
pandemic. At the same time, slowing down disease transmission appear to cause large economic
costs due to a fall in both consumption and production. Fernandes (2020) estimates the costs
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of the Covid-19 outbreak for 30 countries under different scenarios, and finds a median decline
in GDP in 2020 of 2.8 percent, but that GDP can fall by more than 10–15 percent in some
scenarios. Many have therefore concluded that the Covid-19 outbreak involves a key trade-
off: a higher spread-intensity is advantageous for economic activity, but disadvantageous for
population health.
This paper analyzes the trade-off between reduced economic activity and population health in
a simple and tractable model. In contrast to most previous work, we simplify the epidemiological
model by only allowing two states: individuals are either susceptible or infected. This modelling
choice implies that the whole population is eventually infected and that there is no death or
recovery from the infection.1 This is overly simplistic for studying disease transmission more
generally, but we believe it can be an useful simplification when integrating epidemiological and
economic models. In particular, our model allows the social planner to influence how quickly the
infection spreads, and therefore also the economic activity and population health, by choosing
a single parameter. A lower spread-intensity increases economic activity, but harms population
health if the number of infected at the peak of the epidemic exceeds health care capacity.
We first show that if the social planner only puts weight on population health, health care
capacity will never be exceeded, which is in line with arguments behind “flattening the curve”
policies. The same conclusion holds if the social planner is also concerned about upholding
economic activity, but production is not affected by how quickly the disease is spreading. In
more realistic scenarios where the social planner attaches a positive weight on economic activity
and it is more harmful for the economy to be locked down for longer than shorter time periods
(e.g., because social distancing policies are more harmful for the economy the longer time they
are enforced), the optimal policy is to (weakly) exceed health care capacity during the some time
of the epidemic.
Our model is deliberately kept stylized and abstracts from several relevant considerations.
The trade-off between economic activity and population health would arise also in more elaborate
models, but the finding that it is optimal to (weakly) exceed health care capacity is more sensitive
to modelling assumptions. There are several possible reasons why a slower spread of the disease
(a flatter curve) below the health care capacity constraint may be optimal in a richer model. For
example, if patients recover from the disease and develop immunity (as in a SIR-model), a slower
spread of the desease may limit the share of the population that is eventually infected. A slower
spread may also be optimal if population health is negatively affected when more individuals are
simultaneously infected also below the health care capacity constraint. Finally, the possibility
that a vaccine or better medical treatments becomes available provides additional incentives to
delay the epidemic.
Although our model implies a sharp trade-off between output and population health, there
are mechanisms that could mitigate that trade-off. In the context of our model, it would be
1In the SIR-model (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927), the letters S, I and R stand for susceptible, infectious and
recovered, respectively. The considered model is a SI-model since individuals never recover from the infection.
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beneficial to develop policies and technologies that can lower spread intensity while harming
production less, perhaps using testing (e.g. Berger et al., 2020). Another potential mechanism is
that high disease transmission may reduce economic activity because people spontaneously limit
consumption and reduce labor supply in fear of being infected also in the absence of a policy
response (Fenichel, 2013; Atkeson, 2020; Eichenbaum et al., 2020). Finally, because we do not
explicitly incorporate mortality in our model, one apparent mechanism that dampens the trade-
off is that high mortality reduces population size and thereby production. However, we believe
this latter channel to be of minor importance in the context of Covid-19 due to relatively low
mortality during productive years.
Our paper is a related to a number of recent papers, e.g., Alvarez et al. (2020), Eichenbaum
et al. (2020), Gollier (2020) and Jones et al. (2020), that combine the canonical epidemiologi-
cal SIR-model (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927) with macroeconomic models to analyze how
policymakers should optimally respond to a pandemic while taking both economic activity and
population health into account. For example, Eichenbaum et al. (2020) assumes that social dis-
tancing reduces consumption and labor supply, which limits spread of the disease and reduce
economic activity. Social distancing hence exacerbate the recession but raise welfare by reduc-
ing the number of pandemic-related deaths. Eichenbaum et al. (2020) solve the model numeri-
cally and calibrate it to the Covid-19 pandemic and find that it is optimal to introduce large-scale
containment measures even if they result in a sharp (and sustained) output drop. Several other
papers using similar modelling approaches calibrated to the Covid-19 pandemic also conclude
that drastic front-loaded policies are optimal (Alvarez et al., 2020; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt,
2020; Jones et al., 2020).
Our modelling approach is simpler which allows us to derive theoretical results without nu-
merical calibration. In this respect, our model is more similar to earlier work in epidemiology
starting with Abakuks (1973) that study optimal disease control under resource constraints (see
Nowzari et al., 2016, for a recent survey). Another related paper in the domain of purely ana-
lytical results is Behncke (2000) who shows existence of optimizers for a number of different
policies. More recently, Kruse and Strack (2020) analyze optimal suppression when minimizing
the total number of infected over time (i.e., a different objective function than in our model)
subject to a cost of doing so, and Morris et al. (2020) analyze how to minimize the peak of the
infection curve when marginal cost of suppression is zero.
The paper closest to ours is Miclo et al. (2020) who focus on optimal suppression in order
to not overwhelm health care capacity. They show that the optimal policy is time-varying. In
contrast to them, the planner in our model is restricted to time-variant polices, but can exceed
health care capacity at a cost. Among the recent numerically-oriented papers Favero et al. (2020)
is the closest as they also take into account that harm increases substantially above health care
capacity.
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2 The Model
An infection spreads in the population and a social planner must decide on a policy regarding the
spread-intensity. The planner takes both production and population health into consideration and
faces a trade-off: a higher spread-intensity implies that the economy needs to be locked down
for a shorter period of time, but it imposes a higher stress on the health care system. To model
this trade-off, we first introduce a simple infection model where a social planner can influence
the spread-intensity through a single parameter.
2.1 The Infection Model
At any time t ≥ 0, x(t) ∈ (0, 1) represents the share of the population that have been infected
before time t. Assume uniform pairwise random matching in the population, and that the infec-
tion spreads with probability p when an infected individual meets a susceptible individual (even
if the infection occurred a long time ago). Assume also that the time-rate of pairwise meetings is
m > 0. In this simple infection model, there are only two types of individuals: susceptible and
infected. In particular, there is no death or recovery from the infection, i.e., the infection model
is what epidemiologists refer to as a SI-model (see footnote 1). A social planner can affect both p
and m, e.g., by different containment policies, social distancing rules and various hygiene advice
campaigns, but only at time t = 0 . The spread-intensity parameter is given by a = pm.
The mean-flow dynamic of the infection over time is then given by the following ordinary
differential equation:2
x˙ = ax(1− x), (1)
with initial value x(0) ∈ (0, 1). Equation (1) uniquely determines the dynamic evolution of the
disease, and its solution is given by:
x(t) =
eat
eab + eat
, (2)
where:3
b =
1
a
ln
(
1
x(0)
− 1
)
. (3)
2To the best of our knowledge the first time the logistic model was used to describe a population growth, as the
one we have above, was by Verhulst (1838) and further developed by the same author in Verhulst (1845).
3Note that eab = 1x(0) − 1. This way of writing the constant in the ODE simplifies later arguments.
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From equation (2), it follows that:
x˙(t) =
aeat(eab + eat)− aeateat
(eab + eat)2
= aeab
eat
(eab + eat)2
.
Note that x˙(t) : R → R+ is a probability density function that describes the infection wave
(in this case, a hump-shaped function, see the dashed-dotted lines in Figure 1), and its integral
x(t) : R → [0, 1] a cumulative density function. Consequently, for a given spread-intensity
parameter a, the “size” of the infection wave at time t is given by x˙(t), and the “peak” of the
wave occurs at the time tˆ where x¨(tˆ) = 0. It can be verified that tˆ = b where b is given by
equation (3) for any value of a. Because the value of b is proportional to 1/a, the greater a is
the smaller tˆ = b is. A high spread-intensity rate therefore yields an early peak of the infectious
disease.
2.2 Maximizing Social Welfare During a Pandemic
A social planner determines the optimal spread-intensity of the pandemic by taking both eco-
nomic activities and population health into consideration. To spell out this trade-off formally
we introduce a production function y and a health function h as a measure of how the economic
activity and the health is affected by the pandemic, respectively.
2.2.1 Production and Health
We begin by specifying the production function y(t | b). Similar to for example Eichenbaum
et al. (2020), we consider a problem in the short run (see also footnote 5), so capital is fixed and
we thus only need to consider labor when specifying the production function. In particular, it
is assumed that production at time t depends on the share of non-infected individuals (i.e., the
available labor force at time t) together with a continuous and differentiable function g : [b, T ]→
R+. The idea is that g controls how production is affected by the “length” of the period until the
pandemic hits its peak at b. It is assumed that g(b) ≥ 1 and g′(b) ≥ 0 for all b ≥ b. These
assumptions on g captures that the further away in time the peak of the pandemic is, the more
harmful it is for production. The following reverse hump-shaped production function (see the
dashed lines in Figure 1) describes this relation between the peak of the pandemic and the output
produced in the economy
y(t | b) = 1− g(b)x˙(t). (4)
To ensure that y(t | b) ≥ 0, it is also assumed that g(b)x˙(t) ≤ 1 for all (b, t) ∈ [b, T ] × [0, T ].
From the production function (4) it follows that in the normal state of the economy, the entire
population is working and produces an output equal to 1 (this is only a normalization, any positive
number instead of 1 is fine). When the share of the population that has been infected approaches
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1, the production again approaches the normalized output of 1.4 In all other time periods t, the
production level depends both on the share of infected individuals x˙(t) and the function g(b) as
specified in equation (4).
Let us now look at the health function h(t | b) that determines the impact on health from
the pandemic. We assume that there is a fixed capacity in the health care system, denoted by
c ∈ [0, 1], so if the peak is “too high,” not all infected individuals can get proper health care at all
times t. In fact, it can be shown that if a > 4c, then the health care capacity is (weakly) exceeded
in the time interval [tl, tr] where (see also the left panel of Figure 1):
tl = b+
1
a
ln
−2c− a
2c
−
√(
2c− a
2c
)2
− 1
 , (5)
tr = b+
1
a
ln
−2c− a
2c
+
√(
2c− a
2c
)2
− 1
 . (6)
From these conditions and equation (3), it follows that the “height” of the peak is exactly equal
to the health care capacity at time tˆ = b∗, i.e., x˙(b∗) = c, when:
b∗ =
1
4c
ln
(
1
x(0)
− 1
)
.
For a < 4c, the capacity constraint c is never binding and all infected patients can receive
treatment.
Infected individuals need medical treatment at the time t when they are infected but not
before or after. From the social planner’s perspective, this means that the health measure h(t | b)
in period t is given by the share of the population that has not yet been infected, or has been
infected before time t, or are infected at time t but receives proper health care:
h(t | b) =
{
1 if t ∈ [0, tl] or t ∈ [tr, T ],
1− (x˙(t)− c) if t ∈ (tl, tr). (7)
Note also that tl and tr are functions of b.
4The results presented in the next section will not qualitatively change if we add the assumption that immunity
is reached when a given proportion of the population has been infected, and that the production instead equals 1 as
soon as immunity is reached.
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2.2.2 The Social Welfare Function
Having specified how the economy and the health in the society is affected by the pandemic we
can now write down the welfare in the society at time t as:
w(t | b) = λy(t | b) + (1− λ)h(t | b), (8)
where y(t | b) is the production function, h(t | b) is the health function, and λ ∈ [0, 1] is a welfare
weight reflecting the importance attached to production and health. The total welfare during the
pandemic is obtained by integrating the welfare measure from time 0 up to some given time T ,5
W (b) = λ
∫ T
0
y(t | b)dt+ (1− λ)
∫ T
0
h(t | b)dt. (9)
The (short-run) objective for the planner is to select a spread-intensity that maximizes welfare.
For convenience, we shall describe the planner’s problem in terms of deciding on the time tˆ
where the infection wave peaks. Note also that one can equivalently consider the problem of
selecting the optimal spread-intensity parameter a since the exact relationship between a and b is
given by equation (3). As it is likely that it is practically difficult for the social planner to spread
the disease “very fast,” we shall assume that the peak cannot occur before some point in time
b > 0. We are, however, agnostic about how close in time b is to t = 0.
The planner’s objective to maximize the social welfare function (9) can be written as6
max
b∈[b,T ]
W (b) = λ
∫ T
0
(1−g(b)x˙(t))dt+(1−λ)
(∫ tl
0
1dt+
∫ tr
tl
(1− (x˙(t)− c))dt+
∫ T
tr
1dt
)
.
Thus, for a given welfare weight λ ∈ [0, 1], the objective for the social planner is to decide on
the time where the infection wave peaks to maximize the social welfare given by (9).
3 Results
The first result concerns the two extreme cases where the social planner puts all weight on either
production or health.
5It is not immediately clear how to choose T . In the remaining part of the paper, it is assumed that T is a
“sufficiently large” constant. This is one of three natural choices of T listed by Hansen and Day (2011, p. 428). The
other two are (i) T → ∞ and (ii) some constant Imin indicating the first time period when the number of infected
individuals is sufficiently large to end the pandemic. All results presented in this paper holds qualitatively also for
the two alternative definitions of T . Note also that because we consider a short-run problem, there is no need to
introduce discount factors.
6In case the capacity not is exceeded for any t ≥ 0, i.e., when there is no solution to equations (5)–(6), this
expression can be simplified. See equation (12) in Section 4.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that b ≥ b and g′(b) > 0 for all b ≥ b. If (i) λ = 0, then any b ≥ b∗
maximizes the welfare function (9), and if (ii) λ = 1, then b = b maximizes the welfare function
(9).
The first part of the proposition states that if the social planner only is concerned about health,
the optimal policy is to never exceed the health care capacity at any time. The second part of
the proposition states that if the social planner only is concerned about production, the optimal
policy is to make the infection wave peak as soon as it is feasible.
We next state another special case, namely the case when g′(b) = 0 for all b ≥ b, i.e.,
when production is equally affected independently of the spread-intensity and when in time the
pandemic peaks. In this case, the optimal policy is again to never exceed the health care capacity
at any time.
Proposition 2. Suppose that λ ∈ [0, 1], and that g′(b) = 0 for all b ≥ b. Then b ≥ b∗ maximizes
the welfare function (9).
The above two propositions states that if the social planner only values health or if the economy
is equally affected independently of when the infection wave peaks, the optimal policy is to never
exceed health care capacity. However, the assumption that g′(b) = 0 is rather unrealistic since
this means that it is not more harmful for the economy to be locked down for longer than shorter
time periods and that the social planner cannot affect the function g by any policy measures.
If these assumptions are dropped and if, in addition, the planner attaches a positive weight on
production, Proposition 3 and Example 1 show that the optimal policy is to (weakly) exceed
health care capacity.
Proposition 3. Let λ ∈ (0, 1), and suppose that g′(b) > 0 for all b ≥ b. If b maximizes the social
welfare function (9), then it cannot be the case that b > b∗.
Example 1. Suppose that x(0) = 0.01, T = 15, b = 3.06, and c = 0.15.7 If g(b) = 1 + b
T
for
all b ≥ b and λ = 0.5, the welfare maximizing peak of the infection wave occurs at b = 6.14
implying that the health care capacity is exceeded in the interval [4.86, 7.42]. This is illustrated
in the left panel of Figure 1 where the infection waves (dashed-dotted lines) are illustrated in the
bottom of the figure, and the production functions (dashed lines) and the health functions (solid
lines) are illustrated in the top of the figure for 11 different values of b between 3.06 and 7.66.
The corresponding functions for the optimal b = 6.14 are marked in red color.
The right panel of Figure 1, illustrates the situation for λ = 0.05. In this case, the welfare
maximizing policy is to set the peak of the infection wave at b = 7.66, i.e., at the time where the
“height” of the infection wave equals the health care capacity (c = 0.15). 
7Note that the results in the example will not change if b < 3.06. The only thing that will change in Figure
1 is that additional curves has to be added to the left of t = 3.06 but they will not be a solution to the planner’s
optimization problem for the given parameter values.
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Finally, we note that the if the social planner increases the welfare weight λ or health care capac-
ity c, the optimal value of b weakly decreases. Thus, if the social planner attaches more weight
on production or if health care capacity increases, the optimal policy is to select an infection peak
closer in time.
Figure 1: In the left panel, the health care capacity is exceeded at the welfare maximizing solution
(b = 6.14). In the right panel, the “height” of the infection wave at the welfare maximizing solution
(b = 7.66) equals health care capacity (0.15).
4 Proofs
Because all proofs are based on the same ideas, we start by stating some general remarks that
will be useful in all of the proofs.
Note first that tr > b > tl > b for all b ∈ (b, b∗) since capacity c is exceeded for all b ∈ [b, b∗),
and tl = tr = b > b for b = b∗ since the “height” of the peak equals c for b = b∗. Hence, the
welfare function (9) is for any b ∈ [b, b∗] given by:
W (b) = λ
∫ T
0
y(t | b)dt+ (1− λ)
∫ T
0
h(t | b)dt,
= λ
∫ T
0
(1− g(b)x˙(t))dt+ (1− λ)
(∫ tl
0
1dt+
∫ tr
tl
(1− (x˙(t)− c))dt+
∫ T
tr
1dt
)
,
= λ [t− g(b)x(t)]T0 + (1− λ)
(
[t]tl0 + [t+ ct− x(t)]trtl + [t]
T
tr
)
,
= T − λg(b)(x(T )− x(0)) + (1− λ)(c(tr − tl)− (x(tr)− x(tl))). (10)
Note also that if b ∈ [b, b∗], it follows that:
c(tr − tl) ≤ x(tr)− x(tl), (11)
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with strict inequality for b ∈ [b, b∗). Finally, if b > b∗ the capacity c is never exceeded so the
welfare function (10) can be simplified to:
T − λg(b)(x(T )− x(0)). (12)
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider first part (i), and suppose that b ∈ [b, b∗]. By the above
conclusions, it follows that tr > b > tl > b for all b ∈ [b, b∗), and tl = tr = b > b for b = b∗.
Furthermore, since λ = 0 the welfare function (10) can be written as:
W (b) = T − (c(tr − tl)− (x(tr)− x(tl))).
From equation (11), it follows that W (b) < T for any b ∈ [b, b∗) and W (b) = T for b = b∗. If,
on the other hand, b > b∗ and λ = 0, the capacity is never exceeded so W (b) = T by equation
(12). This proves part (i) of the proposition.
To prove part (ii), note that since λ = 1, the welfare function (10) reduces to:
W (b) = T − g(b)(x(T )− x(0)). (13)
Since g(b) ≥ 1 and g′(b) > 0 for all b ≥ b, and x(T )− x(0) > 0, it follows that equation (13) is
maximized when b is minimized. Hence, b = b maximizes equation (13). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider first the case when b ∈ [b, b∗]. Because g(b) = 1 and g′(b) = 0
for all b ≥ b by assumption, equation (10) reduces to:
W (b) = T − λ(x(T )− x(0)) + (1− λ)(c(tr − tl)− (x(tr)− x(tl))). (14)
Because T − λ(x(T )− x(0)) is a constant, equation (14) is, by condition (11), maximized when
b = b∗, i.e., when W (b∗) = T − λ(x(T ) − x(0)). To complete the proof, we need only to
demonstrate that the welfare equals T − λ(x(T ) − x(0)) for any b > b∗. But if b > b∗, the
capacity is never exceeded so the welfare function is given by equation (12) for g(b) = 1 and
g′(b) = 0, i.e., W (b) = T − λ(x(T )− x(0)) for all b > b∗, which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first the case when b ∈ [b, b∗]. Then the welfare function is
given by equation (10),
W (b) = T − λg(b)(x(T )− x(0)) + (1− λ)(c(tr − tl)− (x(tr)− x(tl))).
For b ≥ b∗, this equation reduces to W (b) = T − λg(b)(x(T )− x(0)). Because x(T )− x(0) is a
constant, g(b) ≥ 1 and g′(b) > 0 for all b ≥ b, it then follows that W (b∗) > W (b) for any b > b∗.
Hence, the welfare cannot be maximized for any b > b∗. 
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